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Now to view knowing or consciousness as a relation carries with it an obvious implication. It implies that the relation is dependent upon the terms related. Consciousness is not primary, but derivative; it occupies a position subordinate to the terms related, and fluctuates with changes in those terms. The American realist, consequently, in viewing consciousness as a relation, is saying something definite about the nature of consciousness. He is saying that consciousness is something which is generated, and thus he is led to describe the conditions of its genesis. We find the American realist, therefore, attempting to tell us what consciousness is and to give an account of its nature. And this, it seems, is a legitimate inquiry, since consciousness is not ultimate, but is something derived from more ultimate terms, which are themselves open to investigation. In the light of this position consciousness itself naturally becomes a subject of analysis. The English realist, on the other hand, viewing consciousness as a term which introspection finds to be present along with other terms, has nothing to say as to its origin or nature.

We see from this brief analysis that consciousness, touching the position which it occupies in relation to the content of which there is consciousness, is taken at three levels. For subjectivism consciousness is *above* content. For English realism, consciousness or mental activity, itself a term of logical equality with its compresent associates, sustaining to them the democratic relation of togetherness, is *on a level with* content. For American realism consciousness, being a relation between terms and logically dependent on those terms, is taken at a level *below* content.

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DISCUSSION

THE PROBLEM OF FORMAL LOGIC

PROFESSOR HOWISON is said once to have remarked to William James, "James, philosophers always say they want 'recognition'; but what they really want is *praise*." I find, however, that I myself am too perverse, hardened, or unphilosophic to want either, and so am a little disappointed with Mr. Eastman's review of my "Formal Logic."¹ Had I wanted "recognition," the honor of a "Discussion" in the JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, had I wanted "praise," quite a number of Mr. Eastman's remarks would have contented me; but I happened to desire a precise indication and a relevant discussion of some at least of the logical issues raised in my book. And of this I regret to say I did not find enough. It is of course very interesting to learn that Mr. Eastman has been brought

¹ This JOURNAL, Vol. IX., page 463.

up in a "little college" where logic had been "forgotten many years ago," and now believes in a "great, democratic, system-wrecking philosophy," or even that he can not speak for Oxford² (nor presumably for the rest of Europe), but it would have added both weight and intelligibility to his rather elliptic and sketchy comments if he had explained a little what he meant by "formal logic," both of the "non-existent" kind he regards me as having (superfluously?) "annihilated" and of the extant kind he regards me as having made the worst of. As it is, it is certainly very hard to make out how many sorts of logic he thinks there are and how they should be related, as also what he means by "consistency," "generalization," and so forth. Had Mr. Eastman endeavored to put his ideas a little more clearly, it might even have occurred to him that his readers might develop some little curiosity as to mine, and that it was his duty as a reviewer to report on them. His review would then have gained enormously by presenting a clear issue between his definition of formal logic and mine, and it would have become apparent that very many of his remarks have no application to my book.

As it is, I found Mr. Eastman's discussion frequently unintelligible, until I realized that what was the matter with it was precisely that he had *not* studied formal logic in his "little college," but had merely given a general and uncritical assent to some of its most untenable claims; this had enabled him subsequently to imagine that he had emancipated himself from all such nonsense, while yet remaining under its spell, thanks to the affinity which its verbalism has with grammar. Now this is precisely the position of the man in the street, and is the worst of formal logic; the less you know about it, the more easily it deceives you.

At any rate, no one who has by painful experience acquired a proper respect for the intellectual output of eighty generations of logicians could possibly regard formal logic as an unimportant thing, or imagine that he was making a harmless concession to it by admitting that it could legitimately concern itself with "consistency in generalization." He would realize that he had thereby given himself away completely, and that no amount of "democratic, system-wrecking" riotousness could after that prevent his philosophy from being very promptly suppressed by formal logic. For if it is true that the "consistency" (or otherwise) of forms of words can guarantee *in advance* the soundness (or otherwise) of the meanings to be expressed by their aid, and can dispense with all knowledge of the

² He may, therefore, possibly believe me when I assure him that all the important formalist doctrines I criticize are to my certain knowledge at present actually taught in Britain. And it would surprise me to be given evidence that they are not also prevalent in America. Certainly American text-books seem to be fully as formal as English.

use to which the words are to be put, and if it is further allowed that meaning is inherent in words and not in persons, it is clear that there is conceded to "logic" a very real and extensive control of all empirical reasoning. Nor will any thorough empiricism be possible so long as "logic" retains any *a priori* jurisdiction over the process of reasoning; a consistent empiricist must discard wholly the notions that "consistency" is ultimately a matter of words and that "generalization" has meaning apart from application.

It was because I perceived this that I refused to recognize a logic of "consistency," even as an "ideal" formal logic might vainly hanker after. I did not discuss it elaborately as an ideal, both because it was too obvious on every page that consistency of any sort is about the last thing formal logic is capable of achieving,³ and because I was proving that the formal notion of consistency involved a total abstraction from meaning, and it seemed trivial to ask whether the unmeaning should or should not be "consistent." This abstraction I showed to be the essence of formalism, and to be almost universal among logicians, whether or not they conceived themselves as formalists. If Mr. Eastman approves of it, all I need say is that he is a formalist too.

I admit, however, that I took pride in showing that the weapons of formal logic could be effectively used against it, and that its doctrines were everywhere lacking in "consistency" and precision. Mr. Eastman sees fit to condemn this procedure as "academic" and "intellectualistic." He has apparently forgotten that logic is a subject which none but professors teach, and that boisterous "system-wrecking" is about the last thing to appeal to them. They live by expounding the systems of others, if not by patenting their own. That is one reason why they will not understand his "great democratic philosophy" at all. There is also another which strikes deeper, as I discovered when reflecting on the manifest inability of most trained philosophers to understand the theory of real knowing. Their minds are preoccupied by certain deep-seated prejudices which have been instilled into them unconsciously by the study of formal logic. It was clear, therefore, that if progress was to be made these prejudices had to be attacked systematically and, if possible, eradicated.

Mr. Eastman's charge of intellectualism would seem to rest on a confusion of intellectuality with intellectualism. Mr. Eastman has not observed that I am not one of those who have despaired of logic and the intellect with all its works, and propose to live by scepticism agreeably diversified by an irrational faith. I defy him to quote

³ It is, however, far from true that "the standard of consistency is never once mentioned" by me (*cf.* pages viii, ix, 6, 211, etc.).

from me any disparagement, either of intellect or of real logic, and can not understand why my rejection of the defective reasonings of intellectualism (shown to be slipshod and incoherent by its own standards) should debar me from availing myself of intellectual appeals where such were appropriate and likely to be effective.

I was accordingly not a little shocked to find that, though Mr. Eastman regarded his theory of knowledge as akin to mine, he could nevertheless assert that it "put value above truth." For of course "truth" to me is a kind of "value," and truth-values are as worthy of exact and scientific study as any others. That is precisely why I objected to the total disregard of this aspect of thought in the traditional logics.

Mr. Eastman's conception of the relation of truth and value, on the other hand, seems to me to play right into the hands of those who have long been trying to persuade themselves and others that pragmatists regard anything handy as true. Hitherto this accusation has encountered a slight obstacle in the facts that the responsible leaders of the new theory of knowledge had always expressly repudiated this simple conversion of the A proposition, "all truth is useful," and that no one could quote any authentic pragmatist who had actually asserted it. But now Mr. Eastman favors them with the very thing they wanted. Alike in his preference of "value" to "truth" and in his rebuke of my "inconsistency" in rejecting formal logic as incoherent in spite of the solace and profit it has long brought logicians⁴ (p. 464), he plainly does imply this conversion. And if he will visit the intellectualist camp with this achievement, he will doubtless be hailed with enthusiasm, and preserved in alcohol—or any other liquor he may prefer.

In short Mr. Eastman's method of defending the voluntarist theory of knowledge seems so unsound, the claims he makes for a Heraclitean "logic" are so unknown to the history of philosophy, his vision of the merits of a "reborn" formal logic is so queer,⁵ the verbalism and lack of humor of some of his criticisms (*e. g.*, note 5) are so glaring, the distortion of my meaning is sometimes so flagrant,⁶ that a horrid

⁴ There is of course no "intellectualism" in this. For to me the "incoherence" means a failure of the purpose to make a consistently formal logic.

⁵ A formal logic that takes account of relevance and purposes would indeed be a remarkable novelty in hybrids (*cf.* p. 465).

⁶ *Cf.* notes 2 and 3. It is a plain statement of fact that formal logic tries to abstract from the personal context of assertions, and there was nothing "derisive" in my saying so. *Per contra* I can not understand how any one could imagine from the passage on page 135 that I was myself proposing to embark on an exhaustive catalogue, in advance, of the meanings of judgments, because I pointed out the failure of formal logic to achieve this self-imposed task. It also strikes me as rather cool (on page 466) to correct my statement

suspicion arises. Can it be that he is really an intellectualist masquerading as a pragmatist in order to reduce pragmatism to absurdity and to sow dissensions in its camp?

That would explain why he should strive to represent my work as antagonistic to Dewey's. As a matter of fact it is in full accord with him. I drew attention to the greatness of his discovery that we do not reason except in relation to a *doubt*, and emphasized that even though this seems as simple as the egg of Columbus once it is seen, logicians have all along erroneously based the theory of knowledge on a relation to *certainly*. Again it should be a material help to an experimental theory of knowledge to have it shown that both judgments and inferences must always be experiments and that formalism's attempt to conceive them otherwise reduces them (and it) to nullity.

Certainly "Formal Logic" does not compete with Dewey's valuable little work on "How We Think." It was not intended to do so, any more than to expound the whole logic of real knowing, which would be a two-volume affair at the least. It was merely intended to show how impossible it is that we should think as logicians think we think. It evinces then an extraordinary misapprehension of its purpose to criticize it as a constructive theory of knowledge. It is meant as a systematic criticism of traditional logic on its own ground. But as systematic criticism must have a positive ground of its own to start from, it implies throughout that the existence of a personal assertor must be taken into account in any logical treatment of real thought. How in detail a real logic would do this I did not propose to show explicitly on this occasion. But as it is sometimes impossible to explain what is wrong without revealing what is right, I could not help hinting how differently a logic of real knowing would handle logical questions. I apologize for these hints, for they may lead to repetitions later on. Naturally they were rather more numerous and detailed in exposing the wholly unscientific character of the formal theory of "induction"; for it was necessary to refer to the actual procedure of scientific thinking in showing that formalist "induction" is just as impotent as formalist "deduction." I intend, of course, if I am spared, to publish some day a systematic logic of real knowing; but it would have been quixotic to embark on so big a construction until the ground had been freed, by clearing away the ruins of the pseudo-science of logical "forms."

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that formal logic tries to abstract from the context of *all* assertions and to restrict its scope to "general" assertions. I certainly did not mean this.